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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the impact of conflict of law rules on international trade from a transaction cost economics perspective. The core question of transaction cost economics, as a part of New Institutional Economics, is how transaction costs influence social interaction and productive activities. It analyses how institutions economize on transaction costs that may reduce, or even completely discourage, socially desirable activity (see Williamson 1989) .
Transaction costs are the costs of negotiating, drafting and enforcing contracts. They include search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs and, moreover, the efficiency losses that result when conflicts are not perfectly resolved.
In this paper we will focus on the costs related to enforcing agreements. As it is well established by social contract theory, a properly working legal system is one of the most important institutions for economizing on transaction costs. In reality however, a multitude of legal orders exists, associated with a law enforcement technology based on the territoriality principle. Both factors give rise to two questions:
Which law governs an international transaction?
2. How can a judgment be enforced when the defendant has assets only in another state? 1 For domestic transactions it is one monopolist, the state, who defines the applicable law and fulfils the task of law enforcement. Legal rules within each state can be judged-at least in principle-as unequivocal. International transactions, to the contrary, involve a multitude of legal systems claiming monopoly power within their respective boundaries. 2 The international legal system is characterized by collisions of norms and gaps between different norm systems.
Consistency of court decisions is often merely coincidental, and the assistance of the judicial and penal institutions in foreign countries is not always reliable.
Conflict of law rules (i.e., private international law) do not change this picture dramatically. 3 These rules determine which court has jurisdiction and which law applies 1 "Enforcement of a foreign judgment involves a court's taking steps to coerce a defendant to comply with the terms of the foreign judgment. Recognition is inherent in an enforcement of a judgment" (Dashwood et al. 1987: 38) . 2 Note, however, that in modern times this principle does not imply that only judgments given by domestic courts and based on domestic law are enforced; foreign judgments based on whatever law can also be recognized and enforced under certain conditions. One example is corporate law. E.g., see Carney 1997 for an analysis of international competition n this field.
.
3 "At present, domestic legal systems do a poor job of resolving conflicts amongst themselves. That is, they do not have an effective and efficient choice-of-law-system" (Guzman 2002: 884) .
"whenever a legal dispute involves parties, property or events that have a relevant connection with more than one legal system" (Parisi and O´Hara 1998: 387) . They are rules of national origin which cope with interjurisdictional problems: "Despite their intrinsic transnational nature, the resolution of conflicts of law issues has historically depended upon the disjointed efforts of individual national courts and legislatures. While nations occasionally attempt to unify the conflict of law rules through international treaties, this area of the law remains fragmented. Disagreement over the appropriate way to approach conflict of law issues as well as the inability of national legislators to endorse a singular solution to these many issues leaves the international community burdened with problematic coordination failures" (Parisi and O´Hara 1998: 387) .
For agents involved in foreign trade these coordination failures are the source of an uncertainty, which we call "constitutional uncertainty". This uncertainty creates specific coordination problems whose solution requires the parties to bear additional transaction costs:
4 "Contracts whose parties operate under separate domestic legal systems (and no over-arching one) face hazards not usually present in contracts subsumed under a single legal system. These hazards imply higher negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement costs." (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1994: 244) .
Consider the following example: in the autumn of 1981, a Cairo-based company agreed to purchase a number of second-hand vehicles from a Belgian exporter. He introduced a German supplier, who received a letter of credit and drafted a bill of lading on the form of a bankrupt Middle Eastern shipping company. These documents were presented to a bank in Zurich and immediate payment was made. However, the cars never arrived (ICC 1986: 6) .
Actually, the matter was even more complex; legal battles became inevitable. As several legal orders were involved, it was unclear which law was to be applied.
Conflict of law is an issue that has gone unnoticed by economists as well as law and economics scholars for a long time. 5 Only during the last 10-15 years has the field attracted more attention (see Whincop and Keyes 2001 ; for an overview see Parisi and O´Hara 1998 or Guzman 2002 and O´Hara and Ribstein 2000 with further references). However, it would be 4 Ex ante transaction costs must be incurred in order to design a proper contract; ex post transaction costs are associated with monitoring and enforcement activities (in case of breach of contract). A third type of transaction cost consists of gains from trade foregone due to inefficient governance structures. 5 Carney 1997: 303 claims that comparative law "has been relatively free of economic analysis". Perhaps this contibutes to the observation of Eisenberg/Wells 1998: 408 that comparative law and international law belong to the legal fields which enjoy the lowest citation rates.
an exaggeration to say that economic analysis has made considerable contributions to this legal area (see Ribstein 2000: 1151;  for reasons see also Guzman 2002) . The state of research in this field is widely considered unsatisfactory (see Guzman 2002: 884 , note 1). The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding in this area. In particular, we derive in this paper some "conflict of law lessons" that might prove helpful for creating an efficient conflict of law system. A conflict of law system is efficient if it provides sufficient assurance to the parties involved in an international transaction that the contract will be honored and thereby fosters mutually beneficial transactions.
Our paper has much in common with those by Guzman (2002) and O'Hara and Ribstein (2000) . Whereas the traditional analysis focuses on state interests and notions of sovereignty, these two papers develop an efficiency approach to the conflict of law. On the one hand, our paper joins these authors by focusing on the costs of uncertainty and the welfare of the parties affected by the conflict of law rules. It shares their view that the choice of an international law regime should facilitate the international division of labor and, thereby, improve the wealth of nations (see also Guzman 2002: 885) . 6 On the other hand, our paper differs considerably from both papers mentioned. O'Hara We set up a simple model of international trade which allows us to identify the expected transaction costs of doing international business and to analyze their impact on 6 "Although the notions of sovereignty that form the basis of traditional choice of law scholarship may represent values worth considering, it is striking that choice of law scholarship has paid virtually no attention to how individuals and their behavior are affected by the chosen rules" (Guzman 2002: 885) . Not everybody would accept the view that modern conflict of law centers on the notion of sovereignties. Since Savigny it is the generally held view that courts are not limited to enforce the lex fori; rather they devote themselves to the enforcement of whatever law that has been declared applicable. Courts apply foreign law in cases that have some significant contact with a foreign legal system (see Parisi and O'Hara 1998: 388) . 7 This is not to deny that conflict of law rules may encourage countries to internalize costs and benefits of their rules (see Guzman 2002: 899-900 ) and also must preserve governments' ability to regulate where externalities create inefficiencies (see O'Hara and Ribstein 2000 : 1163 -1165 The focus of this paper will be on rules determining adjudicatory jurisdiction rather than on choice of law issues (for the difference see Parisi and O´Hara 1998: 388 and analyze the impact of the international legal order on the parties' incentives.
The paper is organized as follows: section II, in a first step, presents a model of an international transaction in the absence of an international legal order. In a second step, the model is extended by the introduction of an international legal order. Conditions are derived under which the international transaction is effectively protected by the international legal order.
Our analytical framework allows the setup of a formal typology of international legal orders. In section III we examine the impact of three different types on international trade:
international anarchy, territoriality-based legal orders and legal orders based on a movement of judgments. In that section we also review how private ordering can overcome constitutional uncertainty in the absence of any international legal order. Section IV derives some "conflict of law lessons". These lessons provide some insights concerning the efficient allocation of jurisdiction when transactions cross borders. Section V concludes the paper. Adam's move before making her own decision. The extensive form of this one-shot game (which is known as the "trust game") is represented by Figure 1 .
Fig. 1: Exchange game in extensive form
Adam's payoff is the first entry in the brackets, Eve's payoff is the second. Adam has two strategies: {in, out}. The strategy in means delivering the good; strategy out can be interpreted as a national transaction (among citizens of state A), which yields a net gain of X.
Eve has two strategies {cheat, honor}. Eve is tempted to cheat instead of honor the agreement. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game is the strategy profile (out, cheat 
The inefficiency is due to the lack of any mechanism that protects Adam's interests.
From Adam's point of view, the costs of enforcing the terms of the contract are infinite.
Adam's not honoring the agreement leads to opportunity costs in terms of Z-X, which are shared in accordance with the terms of trade Y. Hence, both parties would agree to employ an institution that makes the option in Adam's preferred choice as long as the gain from cooperation Z-X exceeds the costs of this device.
The extended exchange game
Mutually beneficial agreements are doomed to fail if at least one of the parties fears that the other one is tempted to cheat. Litigation is supposed to prevent this opportunism. In this section we add a litigation stage to the trust game introduced in section III.1. In the extended game (see Fig. 2 ), Adam is given the option of suing Eve for Y (see node A 2 ). 10 Hence, Y is the amount at stake.
Fig. 2: The contract game
If Adam chooses to sue, the game reaches the node labeled J, which represents a judicial decision. In this paper we do not analyze the court's decision-making process itself, but represent it by the plaintiff's probability of prevailing. The judge J decides in favor of the plaintiff Adam with probability p i ; with 1-p i the defendant Eve prevails. Index i indicates the 10 To give Adam the option of suing Eve may serve as a device against contractual opportunism, but it opens up another source of opportunistic behavior: Adam might bring suit even though he knows that the other party has fulfilled her contractual obligation. We neglect this type of litigation which can be labeled as opportunistic litigation (for a comprehensive analysis see Kirstein and Schmidtchen 1997 Fig. 2 by node P). Again, we represent this court by a probability distribution. We denote the probability that court P in country j acknowledges the foreign judgment of state i (and gives permission to enforce it) as
{A; E; H}). With probability (1-q ij ), this is denied. We are now in a position to define constitutional uncertainty in a precise manner by the following inequalities: an international transaction suffers from constitutional uncertainty if
{A; E; H} and i © . For ease of exposition, we assume that recognition and enforcement do not produce additional costs. Plaintiff Adam has to pay the litigation costs before the hearing proceeds. We first apply the British rule of cost allocation, which means that the loser of a suit must bear the litigation costs of both parties (denoted C i ). The payoffs for each path through the game tree are straightforward and indicated at the respective end nodes.
In a second step, the American rule of cost allocation is analyzed according to which each party has to bear its own litigation costs regardless of the outcome of the trial.
3) Subgame-perfect equilibria a) British cost allocation rule
We are interested in the impact of the litigation stage on the underlying behavior (as modeled by the exchange game). To be more specific, we derive a condition for bilateral contractual compliance, i.e., that the contract will be honored by both parties. Applying the logic of backwards induction, the analysis starts at node A 2 . At this node, a breach of contract has occurred and Adam must decide whether or not to bring a suit (and where).
Assume, for the moment, that Adam has only one option for taking legal action against Eve, namely in country i, and can only enforce a verdict in land j. In this situation, he would bring suit in country E if the following condition holds:
This condition can be simplified to
Thus, the likelihood of effective legal protection must exceed a threshold determined by the litigation costs C i and the value of the case Y. If condition (2) is fulfilled, then Eve expects
Adam to bring suit (in country i). She then prefers to honor the contract (over breaching it) if
This is equivalent to
Conditions (2) and (4) This establishes our first proposition:
Proposition 1: Given the British cost allocation rule in the contract game, the option to sue in country i and enforce the judgment in country j induces bilateral contractual compliance if and only if
Note that expression (5) is equivalent to } ; max{ ) (
. We now relax the assumption that legal protection can be sought in only one country. If Adam may choose where to bring suit against Eve and Eve possibly possesses assets in more than just one country, then this leads to the following corollary to the above proposition: 12 One can also derive conditions for one-sided contractual compliance or for equilibria in which both parties cheat. As for the former, Adam could be motivated to fulfill his part of the contract if
and condition (2) holds. It pays to take the risk of being cheated. For a comprehensive analysis see Kirstein and Neunzig 1998. This is equivalent to
The right-hand side of inequality (2a) We can take the value of p i q ij as an indicator of the degree of constitutional uncertainty; condition (2b) then reveals that constitutional uncertainty affects the threshold value via the numerator and the denominator. A similar formula can be derived from (4):
which is equivalent to This effect is brought about via the numerator and the denominator of E Y .
Bilateral contractual compliance requires:
Note that Adam's expected transaction costs are inversely related to Eve's expected Interpreting Y as the terms of trade (5 a Even if all those barriers (for example, tariffs, quotas) would be eliminated, there would still be room for coordination inefficiency. Traditional international economics has long acknowledged the existence of additional risks in doing international business (see Herring 1984) . However, "uncertainty is imposed as a model-exogenous datum, on preferences, technology or endowments" (Pomery 1984: 420) . Usually, it is treated in the form of random shocks that originate from various sources (see Helpman 1985: 72) . Although in practice, trade-whether national or international-is based on contracts, questions of international contracting were put into the background by the traditional economics of international trade. Following the general equilibrium approach, this theory is interested in the allocation of factors of production and the exchange of goods. As Pomery puts it: "Walrasian price-coordination has dominated the traditional literature…" (Pomery 1984: 425) .
induce Adam to bring an action in country i and seek enforcement in country j, the following must hold:
The likelihood of an effective legal protection must exceed a threshold value determined by the plaintiff's litigation cost P and the value of the case Y. If (7) holds, then Eve honors the contract if
which is equivalent to
If conditions (7) and (9) If the conditions for bilateral contractual compliance are fulfilled, then the transaction proceeds smoothly, i.e., the courts are not called upon. Condition (10) allows for the following interpretation: the higher p i , q ij , Y, or D i , or the lower P i is, the higher is the likelihood of a mutually beneficial transaction. Rearranging (7) we receive 14 (7 a)
A Ỹ is a threshold value defining a lower limit which the amount at stake Y must at least reach in order to induce Adam to bring a suit. This threshold depends on a parameter standing for the enforcement costs P i and a parameter reflecting the degree of constitutional uncertainty p i 9 q ij . Rearranging (9) leads to
The term on the right hand side of (9 a 
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS
In this section we want to give more body to the analysis of international legal orders.
We start with a definition of a general analytical concept of an international legal order.
14 It is not necessarily the case that the parties' litigation costs in court systems using the American rule are identical with those in court systems governed by the British rule.
Definition
The An agreement between A and E to mutually acknowledge and enforce foreign judgements leads to q AA = q AE = q EA = q EE = 1.
The model allows for international differences in the winning probabilities. Consider the case p A > p E > 0: such a difference can be due to different propensities for discrimination ("domestic" or "xenophobian" bias): E-judges are rather unfriendly to plaintiffs from A in comparison to A-judges. The difference in the probabilities could alternatively be explained by differences in the substantive applicable law or the procedural law.
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Applications
We have defined an international legal order in stylized parameters which are relevant for economic decision-making. This allows us to model any factual and any conceivable conflict of law rules and doctrines. For simplicity, we assume that Eve holds all of her assets in her home country E.
Subsequently, we distinguish three polar types of international legal orders:
territoriality based legal orders, and U legal orders which allow for the enforcement of foreign judgments by domestic courts.
The term 'territoriality based legal orders' describes systems in which foreign court judgments are not enforced by a domestic court and should, therefore, not be confused with the 'territoriality principle'. The latter means that the power of a nation state to enforce law is restricted to its territory, while the former refers to the source of the law the judgment is based 14 Note that the international private law is national law. There are as many 'conflicts of laws' as we have nation states. Thus, we have conflicts of laws on the level of the conflict of law rules. Table 1 reveals that an international legal order is a rather complex system. This insight raises the question whether the nature of constitutional uncertainty is actually captured by the model. In the model constitutional uncertainty appears as a kind of risk. If the parties know the identity of i and j, they are assumed to surely know p i and q ij . Thus, it is easy to figure out whether or not conditions (5) or (10) are violated. In reality, matters are much more complex, suggesting an interpretation of constitutional uncertainty as a kind of Knightian uncertainty. This means that the parties do not know the exact values of p i and q ij . The parties are prone to commit errors. This uncertainty as to the true values of the probabilities increases the transaction costs of international trade. Even worse, the parties to an international transaction might be uncertain about the i and j which must be considered as relevant for their transaction.
upon. In territoriality based legal orders only the judgments of home courts are enforceable within a territory. 
a) International anarchy and private ordering
International anarchy is a world in which no court has jurisdiction over issues concerning international affairs. There are no legal rules for international transactions; hence, foreign judgments are not enforceable: q ij = 0 for iV j, which implies p i q ij = 0 even if p i > 0. It is obvious that international anarchy is best described by the simple international exchange game (see Fig. 1 ). Transaction costs create a barrier to international trade. If transactions occur, then this can be explained by "private ordering".
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Private ordering refers to institutions or rules for settling conflicts in the absence of-or as amendments to-courts (see Eisenberg 1976; Galanter 1981: 8, 23; Williamson 1984: 208) .
Examples for private ordering are trust, reputation, collaterals, hands-tying, repeated transactions, multinational firms, arbitration, informal institutions, and informal norms such as reciprocity, loyalty, or ideology. Although the distinction between 'private ordering' on the one hand and 'legal centralism' on the other is crucial, in reality any order usually rests on a mixture.
One reason why we can observe an extensive international division of labor in the presence of anarchy is the fact that interaction does not take place one time only, but repeatedly: international traders play iterated games. The other reason would be a direct manipulation of the payoff structure in the one-shot game (of Fig. 1 ).
A game is "iterated" if the single transaction is embedded in a long-term contract relationship, which gives scope for conditional cooperative behavior. Let us examine the situation where Adam and Eve experience a finitely repeated game with uncertainty about the 16 The term is coined in analogy to an idea that is at the heart of conflict of law doctrines, according to which the law of jurisdiction has to be applied where actions took place or where property was located. In 'territoriality based legal orders' the location of the forum defines the territory within which enforcement can take place. Territoriality based legal orders have a lot in common with systems in which the choice of applicable law has been linked to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the court (see Parisi and O'Hara 1998: 388) : "In such a hypothetical world, cases would have been decided by the jurisdiction most closely connected to the case and courts would have never applied foreign law" (Parisi/O'Hara 1998: 388) . However, modern conflict of law systems treat jurisdictional and choice of law issues differently (see Parisi/O'Hara 1998: 388) . 17 On the incentives to honor trade agreements when formal national or transnational institutions that enforce contracts and protect property rights are weak or absent, see Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990 , Greif 1992 , 1993 , Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994 , Schmidtchen and Schmidt-Trenz 1990a , 1990b , Schmidt-Trenz and Schmidtchen 1991 future. A finitely repeated game has a finite number of stage games, but the players are uncertain about when the game ends. Within a repeated interaction, Adam and Eve can adopt conditional punishment strategies that induce the trading partner to honor the contract. These strategies allow for punishing other players if they deviate from the terms of the agreement. If the prospect of the punishment is sufficiently severe, Adam and Eve will be deterred from deviation.
Even under anonymity, cooperation can be explained if the international transaction is carried out by one or several mediators, e.g., export-import houses that-due to iterationmaintain a long-term self-enforcing business relationship. 18 In such a case Adam and Eve draw up enforceable contracts with domestic business partners, and the international transaction and the risk associated with it lies in the hands of international traders who rely on private ordering.
The wide-spread institution of "documentary letters of credit" works in a similar way.
Here, international payments are carried out by international correspondent banks which stand in a long-term relationship to each other and therefore act cooperatively without the need for legal centralism.
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Obviously, the category of "relational contracts" (Macneil 1978 ) is of predominant importance to overcome international anarchy. It analyzes contracts as governance structures for long-term relationships. Discrete transactions between anonymous agents (trade between "faceless buyers and sellers") would hardly work in anarchy, but require a developed legal system and a protective safeguard as in an ideal domestic economy.
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Just as cooperation can be brought about by a manipulation of the probability of a new business deal, it can be influenced by the manipulation of Eve's payoff, i.e., condition (3), in case of the British rule, or condition (8), in case of the American rule. One way to ensure cooperation is through "hands-tying" (see Kronman 1985) by sinking specific investments or 18 See Schmidt-Trenz and Schmidtchen 1990: 335, where the function of a mediator is discussed for an iterated prisoner's dilemma game in which the players play the Tit-for-Tat strategy. 19 Explanation of changes in international trade should, therefore, refer to the nexus between trade and financial services. Usually, there is a strong relationship between the volume and the structure of international trade and the evolution of its institutional framework (governance structures). 20 Numerous analyses confirm our hypothesis that foreign trade is dominated by long-term business relationships such as "F-connections" (Ben-Porath 1980): foreign trade is dominated by the categories family, friendship, and firms. For the family as an institutional arrangement consider the Jewish trading network during the Middle Ages. The formation of trade clubs (Carr and Landa 1983; Cooter and Landa 1984) , such as the Hanseatic League, can be classified as a "trade friendship". Accordingly, the multinational firm can be explained as a relational contract (Schmidtchen and Schmidt-Trenz 1990b) . Any form of vertical integration across state borders can be regarded as a means to construct indispensable reciprocal relationships which prove to be self-supporting even in the absence of effective protective authorities.
transfering hostages-think of bank guarantees-so that the cooperative behavior is induced.
A hostage is a good valuable only to the "giver". Let h E be Eve's hostage to Adam. Posting the hostage by Eve yields, e.g., u A (h E ) = 0 and u E (h E ) = Y, with u A , u E representing the value of the hostage to Adam and Eve respectively. Hostage-giving would change Eve's pay-off from cheating to Z -Y, which is identical to her honor-payoff. Thus, bilateral contractual compliance would be induced. 21 The exchange of the hostage reduces the "cheating interest"
and strengthens the "honoring interest".
b) Territoriality based legal orders
In territoriality based legal orders the courts of the states will only enforce domestic judgments, (5) or (10) The conditions under which a foreign judgment has to be recognized by a state.
It is necessary to agree upon unambiguously which court should have jurisdiction and 24 The probabilities of winning and enforcement increase (a) when courts exercise impartiality in their proceedings and rulings and when (b) the courts are sufficiently competent to handle the cases. "Impartiality refers to absence of corruption and to the lack of any home bias that may influence the court's verdict" (Berkowitz et. al 2003: 7) . 25 An example is the Brussels Convention of 1968 (BC) on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Its purpose is "to create a legal environment favorable to the objectives of the community, and more particularly that of a well-functioning common market in which goods and services, and the labour, enterprise and capital that produce them, would move unhampered by national frontiers" (Dashwood et. al. 1987:3) . As the European Commission puts it, the convention "ensures that judgments given by the courts of the Member States are recognized throughout the whole community and sets up a mechanism to facilitate the enforcement of judgments given in one contracting state in another contracting state" (European Commission 1995: 331) . The Brussels Convention seeks to ensure that there is a basic legal environment in which commerce can prosper. Based on the Rome Treaty article 220 "all Member States are required to ratify it and it is a condition on accession to the EU that accession states accept the system, which has been achieved through accession conventions" (European Commission 1995: 332) . The scope of the Convention, however, is limited. It is confined to civil and commercial matters and does neither extend to revenue, customs or administrative matters, nor to family matters, social security, bankruptcy or arbitration (see European Commission 1995: 331).
which procedural rules have to be applied by the courts in order to receive recognition of the judgment. The circumstances under which a foreign judgment can be enforced. {A;E;H}; q ij = 1, with i = j. Free movement of judgments comes down to an automatic recognition and enforcement of them. If the acknowledgement of a foreign judgment requires examination by a domestic court, then the enforcement probabilities may be smaller than 1:
However, these values may still suffice for conditions (5) or (10) to be fulfilled. Thus, within our model, moving towards a system with automatic recognition will always foster the efficiency of international trade.
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IV. CONFLICT OF LAW LESSONS
There are several policy implications emerging from our analysis.
(1) The parties to the transaction should be permitted to choose the applicable law through contract if third-party effects are absent
Since the parties of a transaction will seek the highest possible return, they have an interest in economizing on transaction costs (in our model: to honor the contract). They can do this to the extent that they are permitted to choose both the applicable law and the court through contract. However, there is a caveat: freedom to choose maximizes the private welfare of the parties involved; private welfare does not necessarily coincide with social welfare in the 26 In a model that allows for opportunistic suits (suits without merit) the examination of foreign judgments can improve matters if the foreign court has a bias in favor of the plaintiff. presence of third-party effects. If third-party effects exist, they should be taken account for through restrictions on the choice available to the parties to the transaction. Dissipation of rents due to forum shopping, however, is not an objection: forum shopping means unilateral forum choice after the conflict has arisen, not mutual ex-ante agreements.
If the laws of conflict do not prescribe the (legal) domicile, then the parties can specify the court of law where any disputes arising under the contract are to be decided. Knowing the winning and the enforcement probabilities as well as the litigation costs, rational parties will determine the terms of trade, i.e. Y, and the (legal) domicile in a way that bilateral contractual compliance results. According to the Coase-Theorem the parties will negotiate a Paretoefficient solution if it is feasible. In formal terms: if the terms of trade can be set in a way that fulfills condition (5) or (10), then parties will conclude an efficient deal. If, however, there is no feasible efficient solution, then this situation cannot be improved by modifying the laws of conflict or multilateral or bilateral conventions. (This does not necessarily imply that transactions are doomed to fail, because means of private ordering might be available.)
Joining Guzman (2002: 913) we would consider this lesson a "recognition of, and deference to, private ordering", even though the choice of the applicable law and the court which applies it is a recourse to legal centralism. In New Institutional Economics, private ordering is generally understood in a narrow sense as a substitute for legal centralism. A contract clause according to which Lex Mercatoria has to be applied, and all disputes have to be decided upon by an arbitration panel, is an example of this narrow view of private ordering.
But this view is too narrow. Arbitration in the European Union, e.g., awards "legal tender" and, therefore, rests on the centralistic enforcement system. Thus, the boundary between legal centralism and private ordering becomes blurred. Private ordering takes place in the shadow of the law. Note that the rules of conflict of law are default rules. However, as it has been argued in the beginning, since these rules are national rules, they contribute to the constitutional uncertainty. Whincop and Keyes suggest formulating rules specific to transaction types. For contracts involving services or the sale of goods they favor the place of performance or the place of contracting because they best capture the presumed intent of the parties (Whincop and Keyes 2001: 44) . However, in the transaction cost framework this argument implies that default rules economize on transaction costs relative to other rules. Alternative rules like "always apply the forum's law" or "apply the law of the jurisdiction with the presumed regulatory advantage" may work. If such a rule prevails and the parties consider it inefficient, they can contract around it.
(3) From an efficiency point of view, conflict of law rules should be evaluated with respect to how they facilitate international transactions.
Most of the literature on conflict of law is only concerned with after-the-conflict issues.
It does not discuss the link to the underlying behavior. From an economic point of view, however, what happens after a breach of contract is only relevant to the extent to which incentives are set for bilateral contractual compliance. This is the ex-ante decision whether or not parties engage in a transaction and fulfill their contractual obligations without pursuing illegitimate lawsuits. Inequality (5) or (10) provides a point of orientation. Conflict of law rules should be formulated such that they increase the likelihood of (5) or (10) If, for example a potential defendant does not have any assets in a specific country, but the rules of conflict of law only allows for bringing suit in this country, this may increase the transaction costs of doing international business to a level that blocks welfare-improving transactions. As a way out, free movement of judgments should be introduced, or a plaintiff should be free to choose the court. Note, however, that freedom to choose the court after the conflict has arisen might result in forum shopping and rent dissipation. Thus, freedom to choose ex ante the court and the applicable law in the contract in combination with a free movement of judgments would be the better option. Admittedly, these rules have the advantage of being easy to observe and to verify. But, in order to facilitate international commerce, the rules of conflict of law should economize on transaction costs. In many cases, residence and domicile are factors that decrease the transaction costs of pursuing a law suit. These rules may, therefore, serve as a proxy for the efficient bases of jurisdiction (see for a similar conclusion Guzman 2002: 920). 
V. Conclusion
Traditional conflict of law scholarship has largely failed to present an efficiency-based approach to conflict of law rules. This paper has applied transaction cost analysis to this field and set up a new fundament upon which an economic theory of conflict of law can be erected.
The new approach should, however, not be taken as a substitute for careful reading of complex legal material. To the contrary, the parameters of the international legal order have to be derived from the contents of the legal rules. In this sense, the new approach opens up a new perspective for the interpretation of the law:
It presents a framework useful for considering the conflict of law questions from an ex ante point of view.
It demonstrates how conflict of law rules (just as means of private ordering) allow economic actors to conduct international transactions efficiently.
It allows us to answer both the question of how changes in legal rules influence behavior (via the parameters quintuples) and whether this influence fosters efficiency.
Properly extended and interpreted, the new approach could even be applied to matters of regulation and other areas of law.
Furthermore, the paper has developed policy implications answering in part the question as to how to achieve an efficient international legal regime. The transaction costs of international business can be reduced by a workable international legal order. In particular, choice of jurisdiction and free movement of judgments play a crucial role in facilitating international transactions.
In contrast to the traditional literature concerned with rules of conflict of law and choice of laws, this paper discusses the issues within an economic model of international trade. We purposefully restricted our attention to a model with perfect and complete information and applied a rather stylized litigation model. This allowed us to highlight the basic structure of the issue. Further research should take into account more sophisticated models of litigation.
